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I. INTRODUCTION
Advancements in technology have made it easier than ever for
employers to monitor their employees.1 These new capabilities, combined with a growing number of employees working remotely, have
encouraged companies to adopt monitoring technologies at an
alarming rate.2 According to an American Management Association
3

Although employees generally oppose monitoring, 4 companies

amount of money every year.5 A study from the Ponemon Instis on privacy, data protection, and
cybersecurity incidents caused by
employees have increased by 47 percent since 2018, and the costs of
such incidents have also risen by 31 percent.6 However, employers
1. See Tam Harbert, Watching the Workers, SOC Y FOR HUM. RES. MGMT. (Mar. 16, 2019),
https://www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/all-things-work/pages/watching-the-workers.aspx
[https://perma.cc/UYG4-UDLW].
2. See Bobby Allyn, Your Boss is Watching You: Work-From-Home Boom Leads to More
Surveillance, NPR (May 13, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/05/13/854014403/yourboss-is-watching-you-work-from-home-boom-leads-to-more-surveillance [https://perma.cc/
Y5BZ-L2Z3]; see also Will Douglas Heaven, This Startup is Using AI to Give Workers a
, MIT TECH. REV. (June 4, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/
2020/06/04/1002671/startup-ai-workers-productivity-score-bias-machine-learning-businesscovid/ [https://perma.cc/6BRS-Q6T7].
3. Hannah George, How Much Employee Monitoring Is Too Much?, A.B.A. (Jan. 2018),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2018/january-2018/howmuch-employee-monitoring-is-too-much-/ [https://perma.cc/8EE5-RDXU].
4. See, e.g., Emma Woollacott, Should You be Monitoring Your Staff with AI?, RACONTEUR (May 14, 2019), https://www.raconteur.net/technology/artificial-intelligence/ai-work
place-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/NQ8G-RZ79]; Robert Booth, UK Businesses Using Artificial Intelligence to Monitor Staff Activity, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 7, 2019, 7:38 AM), https://www.
theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/07/uk-businesses-using-artifical-intelligence-to-monitorstaff-activity [https://perma.cc/CP2Y-29LX].
5. See What is an Insider Threat?, PROOFPOINT, https://www.proofpoint.com/us/threatreference/insider-threat [https://perma.cc/GLS9-9KT4].
6. PONEMON INST., 2020 COST OF INSIDER THREATS GLOBAL REPORT 3 (2020), https://
cdw-prod.adobecqms.net/content/dam/cdw/on-domain-cdw/brands/proofpoint/ponemon-globalcost-of-insider-threats-2020-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8HVY-3EQT].
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are not just dealing with cybersecurity concerns. They also have to
worry about employees wasting time online,7 employees sending
company information outside the network,8 and other instances of
inappropriate computer use.9
As employers ingest ever-growing quantities of employee network data, they are starting to turn to machine learning to help
them analyze and make sense of this information.10 Although machine learning tools make dealing with large amounts of data easier
than before, they can come with significant drawbacks, namely
algorithmic discrimination.11 In an employee monitoring context,
algorithmic discrimination could result in the algorithm flagging
people in one group as potentially more likely to commit violations
than others, which could thus result in the employer taking more
adverse actions against that group. 12
As a preliminary matter, it is important to first address the looming question of why discrimination in employee monitoring matters.
If the programs are still catching people who do bad things, such as
sending out proprietary information or making fantasy football
spreadsheets on company time, should anyone care if more of the
people who are caught belong to a particular group? This is a legitimate question, particularly given the assumption that many
companies are unlikely to intentionally use these tools to discriminate against their own employees (it is in their self-interest to avoid
such practices which, if discovered, could lead to lawsuits).
7. See, e.g., Cheryl Conner, Wasting Time at Work: The Epidemic Continues, FORBES
(July 15, 2015, 5:39 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/cherylsnappconner/2015/07/31/wastingtime-at-work-the-epidemic-continues/?sh=430551011d94 [https://perma.cc/SQQ2-YYN7].
8. See, e.g., Zack Whittaker, Amazon Fires Employees for Leaking Customer Email
Addresses and Phone Numbers, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 10, 2020, 5:22 PM), https://tech
crunch.com/2020/01/10/amazon-employees-email-address/ [https://perma.cc/GGB2-M8EJ].
9. See The Latest on Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, AM. MGMT. ASSOC. (Apr.
8, 2019), https://www.amanet.org/articles/the-latest-on-workplace-monitoring-and-surveillance/ [https://perma.cc/LAY6-R5ZT].
10. See Rick Bales, Artificial Intelligence in the Workplace, OHIO STATE BAR ASS N (July
20, 2020), https://www.ohiobar.org/member-tools-benefits/practice-resources/practice-librarysearch/practice-library/section-newsletters/2020/artificial-intelligence-in-the-workplace/
[https://perma.cc/CG9L-3A45].
11. See Jenifer Winter, Algorithmic Discrimination: Big Data Analytics and the Future
of the Internet, in 17 PUB. ADMIN. & INFO. TECH. 125, 131-32 (Jennifer Winter & Ryota Ono
eds., 2015).
12. See id.
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To illustrate why discriminatory employee monitoring is concerning, consider the police practice of patrolling African-American
neighborhoods more than neighboring white neighborhoods.13 Discriminatory employee monitoring functions in a similar fashion. In
both practices, people are caught committing acts that are wrong,
whether they be crimes or violations of company policy. The more an
employer targets or watches particular employees, the more likely
it is to find that those people did something wrong.14 This wrong can
be large, such as sending company earnings reports to competitors,
or small, such as sending home a company newsletter that includes
some proprietary information.15
This Note will argue that Title VII, as courts currently apply the
law, does not adequately protect employees from algorithmic discrimination when companies use machine learning to monitor their
employee monitoring tools work, how employers are using machine
learning in their monitoring programs, and how these programs can
discriminate. Because scholars have already done significant work
in this area, this Note will not try to replicate this research but will
provide an overview of how this discrimination can occur. Parts II
and III will then analyze how an employee might prove a Title VII
treatment theory of discrimination and ultimately conclude that an
employee is unlikely to succeed under this theory of discrimination.
Part III then analyzes a potential claim under the disparate impact
theory of discrimination, analyzing each of the three prongs of the
disparate impact test. This Note ultimately concludes that, although
13. See, e.g., Ronald Weitzer & Rod K. Brunson, Policing Different Racial Groups in the
United States, 35 CAHIERS POLITIESTUDIES 129, 135-40 (2015); Will Douglas Heaven,
Predictive Policing Algorithms Are Racist. They Need to Be Dismantled., MIT TECH. REV.
(July 17, 2020), https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/07/17/1005396/predictive-policingalgorithms-racist-dismantled-machine-learning-bias-criminal-justice/ [https://perma.cc/
5MHQ-WH5X].
14. Cf. Weitzer & Brunson, supra note 13; Heaven, supra note 13.
15. See Joshua Stowers, 7 Ways Your Work Tech is Betraying Your Privacy, BUS. NEWS
DAILY (Dec. 21, 2021), https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/7928-work-computer-employeemonitoring.html [https://perma.cc/H8YK-HTV4]; see also Christopher M. Sullivan & Zachary
Does More Policing Lead to Less Crim
, WASH.
POST (July 25, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2016/07/25/
does-more-policing-lead-to-less-crime-or-just-more-racial-resentment/ [https://perma.cc/NKX25HC6].
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disparate impact appears better suited to address algorithmic
discrimination in employee monitoring, an employee is still unlikely
to succeed under this theory. Part IV discusses potential ways to
address the issue of algorithmic discrimination in employee
monitoring and ultimately concludes that a negligent use of
technology standard would best suit the interests of both employers
and employees.
I. EMPLOYEE MONITORING, MACHINE LEARNING, AND
ALGORITHMIC DISCRIMINATION
Generally, employers try to answer four main questions with
their employee monitoring programs: (1) which employees may
pose liability risks?; (2) who threatens to share its data without
authorization?; (3) who is trying to harm its network?; and (4) which
employees are more, or less, productive?16 These questions are usu17
The
ally incorporated into an em
usage policy typically outlines what employees are and are not allowed to do on company computers and warns that any violation of
the policies can lead to employment consequences.18 Examples of
computer policy provisions include prohibitions on personal email
use, harassing or explicit content, downloading unknown software,
and providing unauthorized access to company systems.19
To answer these questions and to identify such actions, employers
20
The programs themselves vary in sophistication and degree of analysis.21
Some provide only basic information to the employer, such as keystrokes and email contents, leaving the employer to read and
16. See Shuchih Ernest Chang, Anne Yenching Liu & Sungmin Lin, Exploring Privacy and
Trust for Employee Monitoring, 115 INDUST. MGMT. & DATA SYS. 88, 89 (2015); Employee
Monitoring Software: Productivity, Security & Compliance Made Simple, VERIATO, https://
www.veriato.com/solutions/use-cases/employee-monitoring-software [https://perma.cc/2SP9U2V6] [hereinafter Employee Monitoring Software].
17. See, e.g., Computer, E-mail and Internet Usage Policy, SHRM, https://www.shrm.org/
[https://perma.cc/6C4J-JF7M] (access by search
browser search engine).
18. E.g., id.
19. Id.
20. See Andrew Milam Jones, Employee Monitoring, 83 TEX. BAR J. 98, 98 (2020).
21. See id.
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interpret the data.22 Other tools perform more analysis on the data
to help the employer see patterns and focus on particular employees.23
The most advanced analysis tool to date is machine learning.
Machine learning is the process of teaching an algorithm to make
decisions on its own.24
25
The computer protarget variables and self-adjusts its algorithms until it determines
the best result possible with the training data provided.26 At this
point, the program is capable of ingesting live data and using the
algorithms it made previously to make a decision based on the new
data.27
One popular example of machine learning is Google Maps.28
Google Maps attempts to predict the speed of traffic flow, and thus,
how long it will take a user of the app to get from one point to
another.29 In order to calculate this, it ingests large amounts of data,
construction sites from local governments, and also factors like the
22. See id.
23. See id.; Employee Monitoring Software, supra note 16; Best Practices for Detecting
Insider Security Threats, INTERGUARD (Jan. 21, 2019), https://www.interguardsoftware.com/
best-practices-for-detecting-insider-security-threats-in-2019/ [https://perma.cc/Y2NY-NKEK]
[hereinafter Best Practices].
24. See Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination is an Information Problem, 70
HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1395 (2019); Anya E.R. Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination in the Age of Artificial Intelligence and Big Data, 105 IOWA L. REV. 1257, 1273 (2020);
Bernard Marr, What is the Difference Between Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning?,
FORBES (Dec. 6, 2016, 2:24 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2016/12/06/whatis-the-difference-between-artificial-intelligence-and-machine-learning/#5bba6c892742
[https://perma.cc/UL35-KCNR].
25. Cofone, supra note 24, at 1395; see also Cliff Kuang, Can A.I. be Taught to Explain
Itself?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/magazine/canai-be-taught-to-explain-itself.html [https://perma.cc/N55W-8X4V].
26. Prince & Schwarcz, supra note 24, at 1273 (quoting Solon Barocas & Andrew D.
, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677 (2016)). This is a basic
Selbst,
description of machine learning.
27. See id.
28. See James Vincent,
s AI Tools to Predict Your
Arrival Time, VERGE (Sept. 3, 2020, 10:00 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2020/9/3/21419632/
how-google-maps-predicts-traffic-eta-ai-machine-learning-deepmind [https://perma.cc/5AFRZQUC].
29. See id.
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30

It uses this information to build an algorithmic model, that is, a formula that gives
more weight to certain features over others in order to predict how
the traffic flow will change when certain variables are added or
removed.31 So for example, based on historical data, the algorithm
may decide that it is more likely to determine the correct historical
traffic flow when it weighs speed limits more than road quality in
a particular area.32
the traffic flow and offer a prediction for how long the drive will
take.33 This model also constantly incorporates live data into its
algorithm to continue to improve its predictions.34
Machine learning in monitoring technologies works in a similar
fashion. In an employment context, an employer could train the
algorithm by giving it information about a large number of employees, some who committed violations on the network and some who
did not.35 That way, when the algorithm ingests live employee data,
the algorithm can use the past data to inform its analysis of the live
data and predict who may be more likely to commit a violation in
the future.36 Once an employer identifies particular employees as
risks, it can then monitor these employees more closely in order to
determine whether they have in fact committed a violation.37
There has been substantial scholarship describing how algorithms discriminate.38 This Note will focus on how this discrimination can occur in the context of employee monitoring.
One way algorithms can discriminate is by learning from discriminatory inputs. As discussed, an algorithm learns and refines itself
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See Kuang, supra note 25 (providing a similar example about using machine learning
to evaluate loan decisions).
36. See id.
37. See Best Practices, supra note 23.
38. See generally Talia B. Gillis & Jann L. Spiess, Big Data and Discrimination, 86 U.
CHI. L. REV. 459 (2019); Pauline T. Kim, Auditing Algorithms for Discrimination, 166 U. PA.
L. REV. ONLINE 189 (2017).
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by analyzing past data and adjusting its algorithm so that it comes
to the correct result based on past instances.39 Thus, if discrimination existed in the past data, the machine would incorporate this
bias in future results in order to reach the desired output that it was
trained to reach.40
Amazon experienced this phenomenon when it tried to implement a machine learning hiring tool in 2014.41 This tool analyzed
employee the algorithm thought the applicant would be.42 It was not
until a year later that Amazon realized the tool had learned to bias
itself against women.43 This bias occurred because Amazon trained
its models off of its hiring data over a ten-year period, and this data
44

should prefer men over women in its algorithm. 45 The same phenommonitoring system were to notice
based on company records of employee violations that a certain
group created those violations, it
more likely to create such a violation in the future. 46
This process of incorporating biased inputs into the algorithm
can occur whether or not the protected class is included in the data
set through the use of proxies.47
individual.48 For example, the resumes Amazon used likely did not
39. See Sandra G. Mayson, Bias In, Bias Out, 128 YALE L.J. 2218, 2218 (2019); Fredric I.
Lederer, Here There Be Dragons: The Likely Interaction of Judges with the Artificial
of an AI depends on its
Intelligence Ecosystem, 59 JUDGES
original programming, the quality of its training, and the quantity and quality of data it
40. See Gillis & Spiess, supra note 38, at 467.
41. See Jeffrey Dastin, Amazon Scraps Secret AI Recruiting Tool that Showed Bias
Against Women, REUTERS (Oct. 10, 2018, 7:04 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-amazon-com-jobs-automation-insight/amazon-scraps-secret-ai-recruiting-tool-that-showed-biasagainst-women-idUSKCN1MK08G [https://perma.cc/93ZP-FFPE].
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Cf. id.
47. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 691-92.
48. See id at 691.
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It then could
50

It is also possible for data creators to use masking techniques,
such as the intentional use of biased training data or feature selection, as a way to insert discriminatory bias into the algorithm. 51 For
example, it is now well-known that due to our fractured society, zip
codes can stand as a proxy for race in certain instances.52 Programmers with this knowledge could thus intentionally include zip codes
der to discriminate against certain
53
races.
These instances of discrimination are concerning, particularly as
employers begin to use machine learning in their monitoring programs to detect possible violations among employees.
II. ESTABLISHING A TITLE VII CLAIM: DISPARATE TREATMENT
According to Title VII, employer
or otherwise to discriminate agai
54

r, religion, sex, or national orThe law also prohibits employers from limiting or classifying
55

To allege a Title VII claim, an employee may assert either a disparate
impact or a disparate treatment theory of discrimination.56
49. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 691-92; Dastin, supra note 41.
50. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 691-92; Dastin, supra note 41.
51. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 692.
52. See, e.g., Alexandra George, Thwarting Bias in AI Systems, CARNEGIE MELLON U.,
https://engineering.cmu.edu/news-events/news/2018/12/11-datta-proxies.html [https://perma.
cc/4WFV-N9VW]; Nicol Turner Lee, Paul Resnick & Genie Barton, Algorithmic Bias Detection
and Mitigation: Best Practices and Policies to Reduce Consumer Harms, BROOKINGS (May 22,
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/algorithmic-bias-detection-and-mitigation-bestpractices-and-policies-to-reduce-consumer-harms/ [https://perma.cc/D3VB-F3MC].
53. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 692.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
55. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(2).
56. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577-78 (2009); Joseph A. Seiner, Disentangling
Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment: Adapting the Canadian Approach, 25 YALE L. &
POL Y REV. 95, 96-97 (2006).
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This Part will first explore how an employee may go about alleging a Title VII claim under the disparate treatment theory of
discrimination. Part III will then analyze how an employee may allege a discrimination claim under the disparate impact theory of
discrimination. Ultimately, this Part concludes that an employee is
unlikely to succeed in a disparate treatment claim because they will
practices. Regardless, even if the employee uses this theory of discrimination, the claim will likely not succeed because the employer
can dispute the claims of pretext by proffering other valid motivations for the action.
It is important to note that this analysis assumes that the only
evidence of discrimination the employee possesses are the facts surcomputer usage and th
actions against the employee. Any additional evidence demonstrating possible discriminatory intent
Title VII claim. However, because this Note focuses on machine
learning and employee monitoring in particular, it will not analyze
how additional evidence may affect potential cases.
Disparate treatment involves claims of intentional discrimination
based on a protected characteristic.57 In order to establish a dishad a discriminatory intent or mo
or taking some other form of adverse action against the employee.58
The treatment cannot consist of isolated or sporadic occurrences of
discrimination.59
Under a disparate-treatment theory of discrimination, an employee would allege that the employer set up its monitoring program
in a way that intentionally discriminated against a particular indvidual or group based on a protected characteristic.60 The employee
could allege this discrimination in two ways.61 First, an employee
could allege that an employer used a protected class in its algorithm
ited States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
58. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 986
(1988)); see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
59. See
, 431 U.S. at 336.
, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15; 42
60. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 577;
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
61. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 699.
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in order to discriminate against those employees.62 For example, an
employee could allege that an employer intentionally coded its
monitoring tool to find members of a certain religious group as more
likely to take company data.63 This alone would constitute a violation of Title VII; however, it may be difficult for the employee to
prove such a classification occurred.
Proving such a classification may be difficult for several reasons.
First, employees would need to know or have a sense that the emtentionally discriminating against, for example, a particular race,
which would be disparate impact.64 Although many employers notify employees that they may be monitored,65 they generally do not
advertise their exact algorithms.66 Second, the algorithms are often
employees.67 Thus without other indications of bias or knowledge
of how the system actually works, an employee may have a difficult
time alleging a specific claim against an employer.
Second, an employee could allege that an employer intentionally
discriminated against her because of a protected characteristic.68 An
employee can do this under either the McDonnell Douglas test or
through the mixed motive regime.69 In McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, the Supreme Court articulated that in order to es70

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. See infra Part III.
65. See, e.g., Managing Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, SHRM (Mar. 13, 2019),
h t t ps : / / w w w . s h r m .o r g / r e s o u rc e s a ndt o o l s /t o o l s - a n d -s a m p l e s / t o o lk i t s /p a g e s /
workplaceprivacy.aspx [https://perma.cc/Z8DG-NGUB].
66. Many of these systems use proprietary algorithms and thus cannot be shared with
employees. See Ulrich Leicht-Deobald, Thorsten Busch, Christoph Schank, Antoinette Weibel,
Simon Schafheitle, Isabelle Wildhaber & Gabriel Kasper, The Challenges of Algorithm-Based
HR Decision-Making for Personal Integrity, 160 J. BUS. ETHICS 377, 381 (2019). Furthermore,
doing so may enable employees to alter their activities in order to get around the system.
67. Sonia K. Katyal, Private Accountability in the Age of Artificial Intelligence, 66 UCLA
L. REV. 54, 59 (2019).
68. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 699.
69. See id. at 696.
70. 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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McConnell Douglas involved an allegation of discriminatory hiring.71 There, the defendant, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, originally laid off Green as part of a reduction in work force.72 Believing
the termination was racially motivated, Green protested by blocking
entrances to the company and was arrested in the process.73 Soon
thereafter, McDonnell Douglas advertised for the same position and
74
Green
countered, alleging that McDonnell Douglas refused to hire him
because of his race and his involvement in legitimate civil rights
activities.75 In analyzing the case, the Court found that Green met
his initial prima facie burden, which in the hiring context involved
a showing
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and
was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain76

However, the Court noted that the evidentiary burden then shifts
lawful conduct met this second step.77
In a case for termination, an employee could present a prima
facie case by showing that she was a member of a protected class,
she suffered an adverse employment action, her performance was
78

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Although the prima facie burden is supposed to be

Id. at 796.
Id. at 794.
Id. at 794-95.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 796.
Id. at 802.
Id. at 802-03.

Gen. Stores, 638 F.3d 984, 993 (8th Cir. 2011)); see also Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc.,
487 F.3d 208, 214 (4th Cir. 2007); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2); cf. McDonnell Douglas, 411
U.S. at 802.
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a low bar,79 it may prove difficult for employees to pass in a monitoring situation.80 On its own, a violation of company policy oftenbecause she is no longer able to point to satisfactory performance to
raise an inference of discrimination.81 Instead, the employee will
82

In other cases when plaintiffs violate a company policy and are
then terminated, they typically establish an inference of discrimination by showing that similarly situated employees also violated the
policy but did not face the same consequences or reprimands.83 This
stated reason [for termination] is
84
In this scenario, an employee would need to find evidence that other similarly situated employees not part of the same
protected class committed similar violations, such as sending emails
outside the network or personal use of a work computer.85 Given the
employees generally do not use
their work computers in front of an audience, especially for quesdaunting for many employees.
An employee can also try a disparate treatment case under the
mixed-motive framework, in which
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, ... that [a pro86
As
Barocas and Selbst note, practically this means that the employee
87

Under this framework, an employee
would virtually never succeed under most employee monitoring scenarios because an employer would always have another motivation
79. See Stephanie Bornstein, Antidiscriminatory Algorithms, 70 ALA. L. REV. 519, 559
80. See supra Part I.
81. See, e.g., Pye, 641 F.3d at 1019.
82. See id.
83. See Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 841 (7th Cir. 2012); Jackson v. VHS Detroit
Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 776-77 (6th Cir. 2016).
84. Coleman, 667 F.3d at 845 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792,
804 (1973)).
85. See supra Part I.
86. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)).
87. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 697.
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for the action. In an insider threat scenario or a scenario of violating
company policy, an employer would be able to cite the violation as
occur.88 Similarly, in a productivity tool scenario, the employer could
point to instances of the employee violating computer usage policies
ing factor for termination.89
In summary, absent some clear discriminatory policy on the part
of the employer, the disparate treatment theory of discrimination
appears to be of little use to most employees who face adverse action
due to monitoring.
III. ESTABLISHING A TITLE VII CLAIM: DISPARATE IMPACT
On its face, disparate impact theory appears better-suited to deal
with claims of discriminatory machine-learning algorithms in employee monitoring.90 Disparate impact theory refers to facially neutral employment practices that disproportionally affect one group
implementing the practice.91 Accordingly, in a case alleging discriminatory monitoring practice, an employee could point to the impact of the monitoring on a particular class.92 To give a hypothetical
example, an employee could allege that although the employer
claimed to have a neutral machine-learning monitoring system,
African Americans appeared to receive a disproportionate number
of violations as compared to other persons in the office.93
On its face, this theory appears particularly apt to solving the
problem of algorithmic discrimination. However, because of the way
the law is structured as well as the particular nature of employee
88. See supra Part I.
89. See supra Part I.
90. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 701; Pauline T. Kim, Data-Driven
Discrimination at Work, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 857, 887
coincides with systematic disadvantage to protected classes, it causes
91. See
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be

92. See id.
93. See id.
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monitoring, employees will likely have a difficult time mounting a
successful discrimination claim under this theory as well.
A. Establishing a Claim
In order to establish a claim of disparate-impact liability, an
employee must first establish a prima facie basis for the suit. 94 An
different groups of employees.95
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has defined the required statistical dispar
on rate for any [protected class]
which is less than four-fifths (4/5) (or eighty percent) of the rate for
the group with the highest rate will generally be regarded ... as
96

on hiring, courts have sometimes applied these guidelines to termiis in fact a guideline and not legally binding)97 altogether in favor of
analyzing statistical significance.98 Needless to say, although the
measure and degree of disparity may differ between circuits,
employees will need to prove that a particular class was significantly more affected by the monitoring policies 99
in the form of disciplinary measures, terminations, or some other
form of adverse treatment.100
Apart from the usual troubles a plaintiff may face in establishing
statistical significance,101 an employee in an employee monitoring
case does not appear to face any unique challenges in meeting the
prima facie burden. However, that is not the end of a disparate impact case.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 557 (2009).
Id. at 587 (citing Connecticut v. Teal, 457, U.S. 440, 446 (1982)).
29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D).
Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1985).
See id.
arply criticized by courts and commen43 (1st Cir. 2014). For more information on the
different tests, see Katie Eissenstat, Lies, Damned Lies, and Statistics: The Case to Require
a Facie Case of Disparate Impact Discrimination,
68 OKLA. L. REV. 641 (2016).
99. See Eissenstat, supra note 98, at 642-43.
100. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)-(2).
101. See Eissenstat, supra note 98, at 642-43.
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B. Business Necessity and Alternative Employment Practices
After establishing a prima facie case under the disparate impact
theory, an employer may then challenge the claim by raising a business necessity defense.102 The Supreme Court has called the busi103

The Supreme Court initially defined the defense in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.
104

Congress directly dealt with business necessity when it passed
demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular practice that
causes a disparate impact on the basis of [a protected class] and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged practice is job
related for the position in question and consistent with business
105

Since the 1991 Act, courts have dealt with business necessity in
ment and others requiring the acti
to employment.106
the context of a Fair Housing
107

108

So far, there are no cases answering the question of whether some
of these employee monitoring programs would qualify as a business
necessity under Title VII. However, federal law allows employers to
109
and federal courts have also taken
102. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); Lewis v. City of Chicago, 560 U.S. 205, 213 (2010).
103. Griggs v. Duke Power Co
104. Id.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i); see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 703.
106. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 704 (first quoting Gallagher v. Magner, 619 F.3d
2006)).
Affs. v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
107. See id.
576 U.S. 519, 540 (2015).
108.
, 576 U.S. at 540 (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431).
109. See Corey A. Ciocchetti, The Eavesdropping Employer: A Twenty-First Century Framework for Employee Monitoring, 48 AM. BUS. L.J. 285, 293 (2011).
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a generally pro-employer stance on issues of employee monitoring
so long as employers provide sufficient notice of the monitoring.110
Furthermore, unlike in the hiring context where courts are determining whether particular traits or qualities are job-related, 111 in
an employer monitoring context, employers are arguably using machine learning for more critical goals.112 In terms of a business necessity argument, companies would likely succeed in arguing that
monitoring for potential insider threats, violations, liabilities, and
inefficient workers113 is critical to most modern companies.114
C. Alternative Employment Options
If an employer is able to meet the business necessity burden, then
the burden will shift back to the employee for the final prong of
disparate impact analysis: the alternative employment options
test.115 Under this prong, an employee may still succeed in a disan available alternative employment practice that has less dispa116
On its
face, this would appear to be a perfect solution to the problem of
discriminatory machine learning algorithms: if an employee is able
to point to less discriminatory
using a different monitoring system
employee should theoretically be able to defeat a showing of business necessity.117 However, deeper scrutiny into how courts have
applied this analysis reveals that employees will likely have an
extremely difficult time in overcoming this hurdle.

110. See Janna Fischer, Big Boss is Watching: Circumstances Under Which Employees
Waive the Attorney-Client Privilege by Using E-Mail at Work, 12 COLO TECH. L.J. 365, 378-85
(2014).
111. See, e.g., Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 703-05.
112. See supra Part I.
113. See supra Part I.
114. See, e.g., 2020 Cost of Insider Threats Global Report, supra note 6, at 3; Kiely
Kuligowski, Distracted Workers Are Costing You Money, BUS. NEWS DAILY (Nov. 23, 2020),
https://www.businessnewsdaily.com/267-distracted-workforce-costs-businesses-billions.html
[perma.cc/RPN7-GZWG].
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578 (2009).
116. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 578.
117. See id.; see also Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 709.
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In order to meet this burden, employees must show that (1) there
existed an alternative employment practice that was equally valid
sulted in less of a disparate impact; and (3) the employer refused to
adopt the practice.118 To grasp the difficulties employees may face
in asserting this claim, this Note will walk through each of the required elements.
1. Existence of an Alternative Employment Practice
First, an employee would need to establish an alternative monitoring practice that is equally
needs.119 As courts have applied it, this is a strict test that would be
difficult to apply in the context of machine learning software, no
matter which alternative employees choose.
If the court has ruled that the monitoring is a business necessity,
a proposed alternative of simply cancelling the program is unlikely
business needs.120 As discussed earlier, employers generally use
machine learning tools in their monitoring programs to answer important questions related to corporate liability, unauthorized disclosure, cybersecurity, and employee productivity.121 Thus, courts
are unlikely to find doing away with monitoring an equally viable
alternative because it does not actually help the employer address
the goals of the program.122
An employee could also suggest as an alternative that the employer modify its algorithm to reduce disparate impact; however,
this would also prove difficult because of the nature of machine
learning and the difficulties in addressing the disparate impact in
the algorithm.123

118. See §§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); Ricci, 557 U.S. at 589-91; Jones v. City of Boston, 845 F.3d
28, 34 (1st Cir. 2016); United States v. Brennan, 650 F.3d 65, 109 (2d Cir. 2011).
119. See Ricci, 557 U.S. at 589-91; Jones, 845 F.3d at 34; Brennan, 650 F.3d at 109.
120. See, e.g., Davis v. Ashcroft, 355 F. Supp. 2d 330, 345 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that
simply doing away with an employment requirement was unjustified because plaintiff did not
establish that it served no purpose for the employer).
121. See supra Part I.
122. See, e.g., Ricci, 557 U.S. at 589-90; Davis, 355 F. Supp. 2d at 345.
123. See, Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 709-10.
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The nature of machine learning makes this difficult because unlike a regular algorithm where one can tweak and adjust the inputs,
in instances of machine learning, the algorithm
different factors in its decision
making.124
reaching a particular conclusion, a problem scholars refer to as the
125

specific alternative
modifications for an employer to implement.
The alternative
would need to be specific in order to meet all three prongs of the
test. For example, in order to determine whether an alternative is
equally effective, a court must have real data to analyze, not simply
a request that the employer make a change.127 Specificity is also
126

alternative would produce less of a disparate impact and whether
the employer knew about and refused the alternative.128
An employer could also deal with a disparate impact in results by
adding the protected class into its inputs and then training the algorithm to produce a less biased result.129 However, this alternative
is barred by Title VII, which prohibits using protected classifications
in any form, including to correct for disparities in data.130
124. See Ariel Bleicher, Demystifying the Black Box that is AI, SCI. AM. (Aug. 9, 2017),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/demystifying-the-black-box-that-is-ai/ [https://
perma.cc/F3MN-BU5D].
125. Professor Fredric Lederer explained this issue in a recent article:
implemented ... may make it impossible to determine causation.... [T]he very
nature of AI is problematic as the number of possible causes and the identity of
the data points involved and data owners may be so large as to create
qualitatively different problems than in the past.
Fredric I. Lederer, Here There Be Dragons, 59 JUDGES J. 12, 13 (2020); see also Cade Metz,
Google Researchers are Learning How Machines Learn, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 6, 2018), https://
www.nytimes.com/2018/03/06/technology/google-artificial-intelligence.html [https://perma.
cc/3MJC-N7WN]; Charles McLellan, Inside the Black Box: Understanding AI Decision-Making, ZDNET (Dec. 1, 2016, 16:24 GMT), https://www.zdnet.com/article/inside-the-black-box-un
derstanding-ai-decision-making/ [https://perma.cc/FW58-X7AX].
126. See, e.g., Jones v. City of Boston, 845 F.3d 28, 34 n.2 (1st Cir. 2016).
127. See id.
128. See id at 34.
129. See Gillis & Spiess, supra note 38, at 471-72.
130. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 590 (2009).
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Finally, an employee could suggest an alternative monitoring system, one that does not produce such disparate results.131 However,
132

In determining this standard,

cost, and burden on the employer.133 In order to equally meet an
ing program would have to obtain substantially similar results to
the original program134
ability to determine unproductive employees, or other goals by the
company.135 The proposed alternative would also need to not be prohibitively costly to purchase or to implement.136 Finally, the alternative could not impose other burdens on the employer, meaning,
in the context of employment monitoring tools, network compatibility or other technical factors that make the tool difficult to operate.137 For these reasons, an employee would likely have a difficult
time in coming up with an equally viable monitoring practice.
2. Demonstration of a Less Adverse Impact
Should an employee come up with a viable alternative monitoring
practice, the employee would next need to demonstrate that this
practice would actually result in a less adverse impact.138 Again, this
would be difficult to establish, because as the Court said in Ricci v.
DeStefano
would be less discriminatory are not enough to meet this requirement.139 There has been no case law on alternative employment
practices and employment monitoring so it is difficult to posit how
an employee would successfully meet this prong; perhaps if the
131. See id. at 578.
132. See id. at 589.
133. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 998 (1988).
134. See id.; see also
1427-28 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (holding alternative competency requirements, such as GPA and
coursework, were not an adequate substitution for a hiring exam).
135. See supra Part I.
136. See Ernest F. Lidge III, Financial Costs as a Defense to an Employment Discrimination
Claim, 58 ARK. L. REV. 1, 32-38 (2005).
137. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998.
138. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 591 (2009).
139. Id. at 591-92.
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company had tried different tools and recorded results from those
tests, then that would be enough. However, the employee would
have to perform a significant amount of analysis in order to prove
to the court that the alternative would have actually resulted in less
discrimination.
3. Employer Refused to Adopt the Practice
Finally, an employee would need to demonstrate that the employer in fact knew about the alternative and refused to adopt it anyway.140 Courts have not yet firmly established what the law means
decisions thus far, it would appear to mean that the employer was
at least aware of the alternative to some extent.141 Therefore, the
employee would need to establish that the employer knew, at least
to some extent, about the alternative practice.
of the alternative employment
practices test, an employee will likely be unable to meet this burden
even after meeting the initial prima facie burden for disparate
impact discrimination. Although, as this analysis shows, it is not
impossible to meet this burden, the extreme difficulty an employee
would likely face in meeting this burden should give pause. If Title
VII does not do a sufficient job in preventing discrimination by
way of algorithms, are companies free to do what they please with
their monitoring programs regardless of the discriminatory effect?
How should courts handle Title VII cases when it appears machine
learning tools are doing the discrimination, particularly in light of
the challenges highlighted in employee monitoring cases?
IV. ADOPTING A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
Given the difficulty for employees in making successful Title VII
claims, this Note argues that Congress should consider amending
Title VII to give employees a better chance of pursuing an effective
discrimination claim. This Part will discuss three proposed options:

140. See id. at 578.
141. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); see Jones v. City of Boston, 845 F.3d 28, 36-38 (1st Cir. 2016).
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anti-discriminatory algorithms, regulations around machine learning, and a negligent use of technology standard, ultimately concluding that a negligent use of technology standard is the best option for
both employers and employees.
A. Alternative Solutions
Some scholars have proposed anti-discriminatory algorithms as
a potential solution to the problem of discriminatory algorithms in
employment.142 Under this solution, employers would not only prevent algorithms from discriminating,143
144
These algorithms
to make them affirmatively anti
would be trained to identify both stereotypes and biases, as well as
to suppress potential biased inputs in the data set.145 So for ex-

ly that an employee would pose a threat to a company and thus
weighted that information in its algorithm. In this scenario, an antidiscriminatory algorithm may be able to figure out that the monitoring algorithm was actually using the sports site as a proxy for
men and discriminating against a protected class inadvertently: the
algorithm would react by suppressing that feature in the monitoring
program in order to prevent a discriminatory outcome.146 With these
anti-discriminatory algorithms in place, scholars suggest framing
algorithmic discrimination as a disparate treatment violation.147
While this would appear helpful in curing discriminatory issues,
it appears to fall short in two respects. First, this approach would
necessitate using the protected classes in at least some fashion in
order to train the data in the first place. Although in effect this use

142. See, e.g., Bornstein, supra note 79, at 550-551.
143. See, e.g., JON KLEINBERG, JENS LUDWIG, SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, ALGORITHMS AS DISCRIMINATION DETECTORS 1
2020),
https://www.pnas.org/content/pnas/early/2020/07/27/1912790117.full.pdf [https://perma.cc/
YS7G-GS2E].
144. Bornstein, supra note 79, at 550.
145. See id. at 552.
146. See id.; Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 712.
147. See Bornstein, supra note 79, at 520.
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would appear to lessen discrimination,148 the Supreme Court has
rejected similar remedial remedies in Ricci, where it held that the
disparate impact was in itself a Title VII violation.149 While this
holding alone does not necessarily preclude using anti-discriminatory algorithms, it is important to note that commentators have
viewed this holding as representative of a potential shift in the
Court toward an anti-classification view of discrimination.150 Under
this view, the best way to reduce differential treatment is to stop
using identity classifications in the first place.151 This contrasts with
the anti-subordination view, which instead focuses on undermining
racial hierarchies and the effects of such discrimination. 152 Thus,
even if anti-discriminatory algorithms are well-intentioned, the use
considered suspect by the Court in the future.
Furthermore, while commentators have discussed using anticlassification principles in the context of hiring,153 it is unclear
whether it would be equally as beneficial in monitoring. In a perfect
scenario, the only function of anti-discriminatory algorithms would
be to reduce discrimination; however, this is not such a simple task
in employee monitoring.154 In the real world, particularly on a company level, there is likely to be some naturally occurring disparate
impact in monitoring results.155 That is, it is likely that in an individual company a particular group may have a higher violation rate
than other groups.156 In fact, it would be rather odd, statisticallyspeaking, if the number of violations was perfectly even among
groups.157 Thus, by trying not to discriminate, these anti-discriminatory algorithms may have the potential to suppress real trends and
indicators, thereby making the results less accurate. In the hiring
148. See id. at 550-51.
149. 557 U.S. 557, 590-93 (2009).
Turn Towards a Zero-Sum Under150. See Helen Norton,
standing of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197, 206-07, 224-28 (2010).
151. See id. at 207.
152. Id. at 206.
153. See Bornstein, supra note 79, at 520.
154. See id. at 550.
155. See, e.g., Dastin, supra note 41.
156. See Bornstein, supra note 79, at 551-52.
157. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 673-74.
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context, this slight inaccuracy, when considering what traits make
158

In employee monitoring there is
no such secondary benefit to this inaccuracy; in fact, such a suppression of potentially useful indicators may lead to significant
harm.
Scholars have also suggested ways in which employers may improve the algorithms themselves.159 However, relying on employers
to police themselves in this endeavor may prove futile without
external financial pressure.160 Moreover, implementing these technical computer science recommendations into workable regulations
is likely to prove challenging both for regulators and for employers
who would be forced to strictly comply. 161 Imposing such costs on a
new and burgeoning technology appears unlikely to encourage
better and more accurate algorithms.
B. Negligent Use of Technology Standard
standard imposed on Title VII. While not a perfect solution in terms
of fixing algorithmic discrimination, it provides a workable alternative to the current statutory scheme and would likely not be as cumbersome for regulators to adopt.
David Oppenheimer originally articulated a similar theory for
Title VII, though he wrote his article before concerns about machine
learning and big data came to the fore.162
proposed that employers should be
158. See Bornstein, supra note 79, at 551.
159. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 731-32.
160. Competition and efficiency concerns are unlikely to eliminate discriminatory models:
[D]ata models are more likely to exhibit bias, and market competition will not
reliably eliminate them. First, biased data models may be accurate enough to
persist in a competitive market, even though they are biased against certain
groups. Second, feedback effects may appear to confirm the accuracy of biased
data models, entrenching their use. And finally, biased data models may be
efficient precisely because they are discriminatory, and therefore pressures
toward efficiency will not eliminate them.
Kim, supra note 90, at 894.
161. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 714-22.
162. See generally David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 899 (1993).
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employer fails to take all reasonable steps to prevent discrimination that it knows or should know is occurring, or that it expects or
163
However, this Note proposes that this
ter address problems with machine learning and monitoring in
particular.
Rather than imposing a traditional negligence standard related
tween disparate impact and treatment entirely,164 this Note instead
proposes a negligent use of technology standard. This standard
would fall under disparate impact analysis and make employers
liable when they negligently use machine learning and contribute
to a disparate impact on a particular class of employees.165
To fit this test into a workable framework for the courts, it should
be situated within the alternative employment practices prong of
Title VII.166 This solution would give employees more options in
overcoming this prong: they could either raise an alternative employment practice or a negligent use claim contending that proper
use and implementation of the machine learning technology likely
would have prevented such disparate impact, and thus the employer
having the monitoring program.167
A negligence standard would likely not be as precise in reducing
disparate impact as anti-discriminatory algorithms and a strict rule
against a showing of disparate impact.168 However, it would provide
a more workable standard for companies because rather than worrying and adjusting their algorithms in order to ensure no disparate
impact, they could instead focus on following industry-best practices
and modifying their algorithms as technology progressed.169 Furthermore, because the standard d
would be less likely to face opposition from anti-classification
163. Id. at 900.
164. See supra Part II (discussing disparate treatment).
165. See supra Part III (describing disparate impact analysis).
166. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii); supra Part III.C.
167. See supra Part III.C.
168. See supra Part IV.A.
169. See supra Part IV.A. For a summary of potential algorithmic changes an employer
could consider, see generally Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26.
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proponents in the courts.170 The negligence standard also gives more
flexibility to courts and regulators than per se regulations prohibiting and requiring certain conduct, allowing regulators and courts to
adapt to rapid shifts in technology.171
Regulators such as the EEOC and the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) could issue guidelines for employers and courts to use in
determining what negligent conduct looks like.172 The EEOC and the
FTC have already started broadly discussing machine learning and
employer best practices,173 indicating that more specific technical
guidance may not be too far off.
On its face, this may appear a seemingly simple solution. However, putting courts in charge of
have to be an ongoing, iterative process as technology progresses.
Current regulatory guidance agrees on some basic practices, such as
regular model testing and protecting the algorithm from misuse.174
However, when it comes to more advanced steps, it may be difficult
for courts to determine what count
particularly in a fast-changing field where companies oftentimes
refuse to share their proprietary algorithms.175 While these practices
pose challenges to developing industry norms, some companies, such
as IBM with its AI Fairness 360 toolkit, are open-sourcing their best
practices and code.176 Similar guidance and tools from major players
170. See Norton, supra note 150, at 206-07, 224-28.
171. See Barocas & Selbst, supra note 26, at 714-22; Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, How
Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the World, BROOKINGS (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.
brookings.edu/research/how-artificial-intelligence-is-transforming-the-world/ [https://perma.
cc/VA3D-CSDA].
172. The EEOC has already issued guidelines for Title VII, which are non-binding on the
courts but do provide a helpful guide. See, e.g., Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421,
1428 (9th Cir. 1985).
173. See Andrew Smith, Using Artificial Intelligence and Algorithms, FED. TRADE COMM N
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in the industry could soon become workable norms for courts to consider when evaluating whether an employer negligently employed
its monitoring tools.
Although this change is imperfect, it would be a step in the right
direction and would give employees another avenue to challenge
negligent and unfair practices as employers adopt new monitoring
technologies in the future.177
CONCLUSION
As demonstrated in this Note, Title VII, as courts currently apply
the law, appears unlikely to be able to protect employees from discriminatory monitoring practices when employers use machine
learning tools in monitoring programs. This significant gap in the
current anti-discrimination framework should concern both employees and employers alike.178 Implementing a negligence standard
within the Title VII framework would give employees another opportunity to recover against employers who use discriminatory
monitoring practices.

177. See Christina Pazzanese, Great Promise but Potential for Peril, HARV. GAZETTE (Oct.
26, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020/10/ethical-concerns-mount-as-ai-takesbigger-decision-making-role/ [https://perma.cc/4CEW-UNCN].
178. See Charlotte S. Alexander & Elizabeth Tippett, The Hacking of Employment Law, 82
MO. L. REV
oyers use software to avoid the employer-employee
relationship entirely, employment law is weakened as more workers operate in spaces beyond

Published by William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository, 2022

27

